As pointed out above, Friedman prematurely assumes that corporate executives are the only party who theoretically could be said to carry any kind of responsibilities in this scheme. He then explicitly rejects the idea of executives carrying social responsibilities, or any kind of responsibility other than that to the shareholders that is, by referring to the concept of Agency Theory. Now, if a company’s owners can be considered to carry social responsibilities, Dunn’s notion of executives carrying social responsibilities per se may even be relaxed - the effects on Friedman’s line of reasoning remain dramatic. Without even rejecting his employing the concept of Agency Theory, without even challenging his parsimonious understanding of shareholder interests which assumes that profits are the shareholders’ sole objective, it becomes obvious that Friedman’s argument features a major deficiency. If executives are the shareholders’ agents and are supposed to act in their employers best interests, executives should consider the owners’ social responsibilities in each and every decision they make, even if these are not explicitly articulated. Thus, executives can be said to carry indirect social responsibilities (as to their actions) derived from the responsibilities enjoined on their principals. Note that this discussion is only concerned with the executive acting as an agent and not as a principal, meaning that social responsibilities derived from his personal environment are not to be considered in this context.